The Disposition Process under the Juveniles Justice Standards Project by Fisher, Stanley Z.
Boston University School of Law 
Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law 
Faculty Scholarship 
7-1977 
The Disposition Process under the Juveniles Justice Standards 
Project 
Stanley Fisher 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Courts Commons, Criminal Procedure Commons, and the Other Law Commons 
Content downloaded/printed from HeinOnline
Wed Nov 13 10:57:56 2019
Citations:
Bluebook 20th ed.
			                                                                
Stanley Z. Fisher, The Disposition Process under the Juveniles Justice Standards
Project, 57 B.U. L. Rev. 732 (1977).                                                 
ALWD 6th ed.                                                                         
Stanley Z. Fisher, The Disposition Process under the Juveniles Justice Standards
Project, 57 B.U. L. Rev. 732 (1977).                                                 
APA 6th ed.                                                                          
Fisher, S. Z. (1977). The disposition process under the juveniles justice standards
project. Boston University Law Review, 57(4), 732-753.                               
Chicago 7th ed.                                                                      
Stanley Z. Fisher, "The Disposition Process under the Juveniles Justice Standards
Project," Boston University Law Review 57, no. 4 (July 1977): 732-753                
McGill Guide 9th ed.                                                                 
Stanley Z Fisher, "The Disposition Process under the Juveniles Justice Standards
Project" (1977) 57:4 BUL Rev 732.                                                    
MLA 8th ed.                                                                          
Fisher, Stanley Z. "The Disposition Process under the Juveniles Justice Standards
Project." Boston University Law Review, vol. 57, no. 4, July 1977, p. 732-753.
HeinOnline.                                                                          
OSCOLA 4th ed.                                                                       
Stanley Z Fisher, 'The Disposition Process under the Juveniles Justice Standards
Project' (1977) 57 BU L Rev 732
Provided by: 
Fineman & Pappas Law Libraries
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance of HeinOnline's Terms and 
Conditions of the license agreement available at 
https://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from  uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope of your  license, please use:
Copyright Information
Use QR Code reader to send PDF to your smartphone or tablet device
THE DISPOSITION PROCESS UNDER THE
JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS PROJECT
STANLEY Z. FISHER*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Juvenile Justice Standards Project volumes were publicly discussed
for months prior to their publication. Unavoidably, much of the discus-
sion was based upon rumor regarding their contents. In that context,
critics charged that the proposed Standards would "destroy the nation's
juvenile court system and replace it with a 'junior criminal system' "1 and
claimed that the Standards substitute the philosophy of "just deserts" for
the traditional rehabilitative goals of juvenile justice. ' The news media
described the Standards on disposition of delinquents as designed to "fit
the penalty to the crime, no matter what the age of the perpetrator. '3 I do
not intend in this writing to argue the merits of these changes-other
contributors to this volume have done so. 4 Rather, I wish to describe the
extent to which the Standards have attempted to move away from tradi-
tional goals and to evaluate the internal consistency of the Standards in
accomplishing any such movement.
First, I will briefly describe the disposition process established by the
four most pertinent volumes: Dispositions5 (Linda Singer, Reporter); Dis-
positional Procedures6 (Fred Cohen, Reporter); Juvenile Delinquency and
Sanctions7 (Sanctions) (John M. Junker, Reporter); and Corrections Adminis-
tration' (Andrew Rutherford and Fred Cohen, Reporters). I will then dis-
cuss in more detail selected features of the process, focusing on major
ambiguities and discrepancies in the Standards. I will conclude by arguing
that, although the Standards on disposition were probably intended to
* Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. A.B., Oberlin College, 1957; LL.B.,
Yale University, 1963. The author served as Reporter for the Pretrial Court Proceedings
volume of the Juvenile Justice Standards Project.
I Resolution of the National Council of Juvenile Court Judges (1976), reported in 2 Fam. L.
Rep. 2663 (1976).
2 Statement of Judge Margaret C. Driscoll, President, National Council of Juvenile Court
Judges, reported in 5 Juv. Just. Dig. 5 (Apr. 8, 1977).
3 3 Juv. Just. Dig. 9 (Dec. 5, 1975).
4 See The Standards' Recommendations on Dispositions: A Panel Discussion, 57 B.U.L.
Rev. 754 (1977).
5 Institute of Judicial Administration & American Bar Association, Joint Commission on
Juvenile Justice Standards, Standards Relating to Dispositions (tent. ed. 1977) [hereinafter
cited as Dispositions].
6 Institute of Judicial Administration & American Bar Association, Joint Commission on
Juvenile Justice Standards, Standards Relating to Dispositional Procedures (tent. ed. 1977)
[hereinafter cited as Procedures].
I Institute of Judicial Administration & American Bar Association, Joint Commission on
Juvenile Justice Standards, Standards Relating to Juvenile Delinquency and Sanctions (tent.
ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as Sanctions].
8 Institute of Judicial Administration & American Bar Association, Joint Commission on
Juvenile Justice Standards, Standards Relating to Corrections Administration (tent. ed. 1977)
[hereinafter cited as Corrections].
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achieve a radical change in sentencing philosophy, in fact they reflect
substantial confusion and ambivalence about the change.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE DISPOSITION PROCESS
At the cost of some oversimplification, I will briefly describe the major
elements of the disposition process under the Standards. We can conve-
niently group these elements under three headings: substantive limits and
goals, procedural and evidentiary requirements, and modification and
enforcement.
A. Substantive Limits and Goals
Roughly, the Standards confine the juvenile court's delinquency juris-
diction to criminal offenses for which adults might be punished by incar-
ceration. These crimes are divided into five classes of juvenile offenses,
according to the criminal penalties. 9 For example, crimes that would be
punishable by death or imprisonment for more than twenty years if
committed by an adult are class one juvenile offenses. At the other end of
the scale are class five juvenile offenses, consisting of crimes punishable by
six months' imprisonment or less. For each of the five classes the Stan-
dards prescribe the most severe penalty, or "sanction," and the maximum
duration for which it may be imposed. 10
Juvenile court sanctions are classified into three major categories: nom-
inal, conditional and custodial.11 Nominal sanctions consist of reprimands,
warnings and other measures that do not infringe personal liberty. Con-
ditional sanctions include those that infringe the juvenile's liberty but do
not involve a change in his residence or legal custody, such as probation,
restitution, community service, and counseling or educational programs.
Custodial sanctions, which involve the coercive removal of a juvenile from
his home, are further classified as placements in "nonsecure residences"
and in "secure facilities." At the disposition stage of juvenile court pro-
ceedings, the judge is required to state the category and duration of the
sanctions imposed on the defendant. The Standards limit the maximum
sanctions available to the judge in each case according to the seriousness
of the offense committed and, to a lesser extent, the juvenile's age and
prior court record. Thus, the maximum sanction that could be imposed
upon a class one juvenile offender is two years in custody or three years of
conditional freedom. And a class five juvenile offense would subject the
delinquent to no greater sanction than six months' conditional freedom
or, if he had a prior record, to nonsecure custodial placement for two
months.
Because the Standards establish maximum sentences but not mini-
mums, the sentencing judge exercises broad discretion. The Standards
attempt to limit this discretion by various procedural and evidentiary
9 Sanctions pt. 5.2.
10 Id. pt. 6.2.
11 Id. pt. 5.1.
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devices and by substantive guides to sentencing, which are discussed
below. The latter presumably include the purposes of juvenile corrections
that are set forth in part 1.1 of the Dispositions volume:12
1.1 Purpose.
The Purpose of the juvenile correctional system is to reduce
juvenile crime by maintaining the integrity of the substantive law
proscribing certain behavior. . . . This purpose should be pursued
through means that are fair and just, that recognize the unique
characteristics and needs of juveniles, and that give juveniles access to
opportunities for personal and social growth.
Part 1I of the Dispositions volume, entitled "Dispositional Criteria,"
contains the major guidelines for sentencing:
2.1 Least restrictive alternative.
In choosing among statutorily permissible dispositions, the court
should employ the least restrictive category and duration of disposi-
tion that is appropriate to the seriousness of the offense, as modified
by the degree of culpability indicated by the circumstances of the
particular case, and by the age and prior record of the juvenile....
2.2 Needs and desires of the juvenile.
Once the category and duration of the disposition have been de-
termined, the choice of a particular program within the category
should be governed by the needs and desires of the juvenile.
Other Standards, discussed below, contain additional criteria to guide
particular sentencing decisions, such as the decision to sentence a juvenile
to secure custody.
The Standards contain another set of important substantive limitations
on delinquency dispositions. These concern the power of juvenile courts
and correctional authorities to compel delinquents to participate in "re-
habilitative" treatment programs. In most instances the Standards permit
the court to require participation in treatment programs as a term of a
"conditional sanction" imposed on a delinquent. Such participation might,
for example, entail attendance at educational or recreational programs,
therapeutic counseling, or work experiences."3 However, such orders are
an exception to the general principle adopted by the Standards that
juveniles have the right to refuse all services.1 4 The Standards articulate
two further exceptions to this principle: first, adjudicated juveniles may be
compelled to participate in activities that are also legally required of
juveniles who have not been adjudicated delinquent-such as compulsory
school attendance and compulsory vaccination 1 5-and second, they may
be required to participate in programs necessary to "prevent clear harm
12 See also Sanctions pt. 1.1 (establishing the purposes of a juvenile delinquency code);
Corrections pt. 1.1 (purposes of juvenile corrections).
".Dispositions pt. 3.2.
14 Id. pt. 4.2.
15 Id. pt. 4.2(A).
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to their physical health."16 The right to refuse services is particularly
crucial in light of another Standard that prevents the court from imposing
conditional and custodial sanctions concurrently: custodial dispositions are
"exclusive sanctions" that may not be used simultaneously with other
sanctions.17 Therefore, children removed from their homes by the court
may not be compelled to participate in any rehabilitative programs out-
side the narrow exceptions regarding physical health and compulsory
education.
On the other hand, the volume on Dispositions gives to all delinquent
juveniles a broad right to services:
4.1 Right to services.
All publicly funded services to which nonadjudicated juveniles have
access should be made available to adjudicated delinquents. In addi-
tion, juveniles adjudicated delinquent should have access to all ser-
vices necessary for their normal growth and development.
In sum, the Standards forbid the state to force residentially placed
juveniles to take advantage of service programs but require the state to
give them opportunities to participate in such programs voluntarily.
B. Procedural and Evidentiary Requirements
The volume on Dispositional Procedures establishes a procedural and
evidentiary framework to govern the disposition process. A major feature
of this framework is detailed regulation of information relevant to sen-
tencing. The Standards distinguish between "essential" sentencing infor-
mation, consisting of the juvenile's age, his prior record, and the nature
and circumstances of the offense,"8 and information on the juvenile's
environment, history and personal characteristics.1 9 The Standards place
special controls on the acquisition, use and sharing of information in the
latter class. They also require a judicial disposition hearing at which the
parties enjoy usual due process protections. Two important evidentiary
principles apply at these hearings: a presumption against the imposition
of custodial sanctions2 ° and a requirement that the choice of any
disposition-other than a nominal one-be supported by a preponder-
ance of the evidence.2" The sentencing judge must make specific findings
on controverted factual issues and on the weight accorded to all sig-
nificant dispositional facts considered in sentencing. Further, he must
record both the reasons for selecting the particular disposition and "the
objectives desired to be achieved thereby. '22
16 Id. pt. 4.2(B).
17 Id. pt. 3.3(C).
IS Procedures pt. 2.3(A).
19 Id. pt. 2.3(B).
20 Dispositions pts. 3.3(B) & (E).
21 Procedures pt. 2.5(B).
22 Id. pt. 7.1(A)(2).
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C. Modification and Enforcement
The Standards severely restrict judicial and administrative authority to
modify the nature or duration of the delinquent's sentence. They do
permit correctional authorities to reduce the length of a juvenile's sen-
tence by five percent for good behavior. But these officials have no
discretionary power to grant or deny "parole" to juveniles in their care. 23
Only the court can order a period of post-release supervision, and it must
ordinarily do so-if at all-as part of the original sentence; for example,
"six months nonsecure custody followed by six months of community
supervision. '24 Correctional agencies and other specified parties may ask
the court to reduce the nature or duration of the original sentence, but
the Standards strictly limit the grounds upon which such relief may be
granted.25 Finally, the Standards provide enforcement mechanisms to
deal with a juvenile's willful failure to comply with the dispositional
order26 and with the state's failure to provide the juvenile with access to
required services. 27
III. DISCUSSION
In this part, I shall discuss three aspects of the disposition process:
scope of the judge's decision, disposition criteria and procedures, and
criteria for modifying the disposition.
A. Scope of the Judge's Decision
One of the Standards' central themes is that juvenile authorities should
have less discretion at the sentencing and correctional stages of delin-
quency proceedings than they have traditionally enjoyed. The Standards
reflect this theme in setting offense-related maximum sentences and abol-
ishing the executive's parole power. Another expression of this theme is
the Standards' attempt to give the sentencing judge, operating within
carefully structured legislative guidelines, more power to specify the dis-
positional program in which the delinquent will be placed. But the Stan-
dards are confused and inconsistent in drawing the precise boundary
between judicial and executive authority in the placement decision.2 8
23 Dispositions pt. 5.3.
24 Id. pt. 3.3(C).
25 Id. pts. 4.1, 5.1, 5.2; Procedures pt. 7.1(B); Corrections pt. 5.1.But see text accompany-
ing notes 87-94 infra.
26 After a hearing requested by the correctional agency, the sentencing court may impose
new sanctions, ranging from a warning to a more severe disposition. But the court is bound
by the maximum sentence length prescribed by the legislature for the delinquent's offense.
Dispositions pt. 5.4; Corrections pt. 5.2.
27 The correctional agency is obliged to notify the sentencing court if the delinquent does
not have access to "all required services." Unless the court can ensure the provision of such
services, it must reduce the severity of the juvenile's disposition so as to ensure access to
services, or discharge him. Dispositions pts. 4.1(C) & (D), 5.2.
28 Some degree of confusion and inconsistency is inevitable given the ambitious nature of
the Standards Project and its history. The four volumes under discussion, all of which
address the judicial and executive roles in disposition placement, were drafted by two
[Vol. 57:732
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Professor Cohen's Standards on Dispositional Procedures assume that the
judge's role extends to specifying the actual program or facility in which
the juvenile will be placed. Part 7. 1(A)(3) requires the judge
when the disposition involves any deprivation of liberty or any form
of coercion [to] indicate for the record those alternative dispositions,
including particular places and programs, that were explored and the
reason for their rejection.2 9
Professor Junker's volume on Juvenile Delinquency and Sanctions sup-
ports the notion that the court, rather than the correctional agency, is
responsible for deciding the juvenile's actual placement:
Juvenile court orders imposing sanctions should specify:
A. the nature of the sanction; and
C. where such order affects the residence or legal custody of the
juvenile, the place of residence or confinement ordered and the person or
agency in whom custody is vested .... 30
The latter Standard provoked a dissent:
Commission member Wald would not require that the disposition
order specify the "place of residence" but only the level of secure or
nonsecure confinement and would leave the precise placement to the
discretion of corrections officials . . ..
In contrast, the Rutherford-Cohen Standards on Corrections Adminis-
tration seem to assume the view advocated by the dissenting Commission
member: part 4.11 elaborately regulates the procedures and criteria for
agency decisions on program placement of youths sentenced to agency
control. 32 And, in the commentary to the Dispositions volume, Reporter
Singer explicitly addresses the issue and agrees that program placement
decisions are to be made by the correctional agency, not the courts:
It is not envisioned that the court (as opposed to an agency) will
determine the identity of the actual program or facility to be used
(e.g., a particular foster home) but that the court will determine the
particular type of program (e.g., community work or foster home). 33
different committees and four reporters. The volumes were completed at different times
over a six-year period; Reporter Cohen, for example, completed his Procedures volume
while Reporter Singer's volume on Dispositions was still being written. The Project of which
these Standards are a part involved four drafting committees working with thirty-three
reporters who handled overlapping assignments. Also, the participants were spread across
the United States. The problems of editorial coordination, inherently severe, were wors-
ened by frequent central staff turnover during the life of the Project. Given this background,
study of the Standards volumes will probably reveal a number of inconsistencies in terminol-
ogy and substance. In some instances, to "conform" the discrepancies may require major
policy decisions.
29 Procedures pt. 7.1(A) (emphasis added).
0 Sanctions pt. 6.1.
31 Id. pt. 6.1(C) n.*. Commission member Polier concurred in this opinion.
32 See also Corrections pt. 7.7 (establishing the agency's authority to "transfer juveniles
between programs within the category of disposition determined by the court"); accord,
Dispositions, Commentary, pt. 1.2(F), at 23.
33 Dispositions, Commentary, pt. 2.2, at 39.
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Taking this statement in Singer's commentary as expressing her volume's
policy on this issue,34 the following allocation of sentencing responsibility
appears: the court decides both the disposition "category" (for example,
conditional or custodial sanction) and the sanction "type" or "subcat-
egory" (community service, nonsecure group homes). The correctional
authorities then choose the precise program within the specified sub-
category in which to place the delinquent for the time period ordered by
the court.
If judges are obliged to make specific program placements, major
changes in the way in which courts are staffed will be required in many
jurisdictions. This will be particularly true in states that are moving from
systems of large state-run reform schools to "deinstitutionalized" systems
featuring numerous private, community-based correctional programs. In
such states, the placement decision requires thorough, up-to-date famil-
iarity with numerous program alternatives. Few judges will have the time
to acquire and maintain this knowledge, even if they have sufficient
training and experience to make good placement decisions. Furthermore,
the placement process-particularly in systems that rely heavily on private
sector facilities-is often time consuming: the youth's needs and desires
must be assessed,3 5 his family consulted, potential programs sought, fund-
ing arranged, vacancies found, applications processed, and so forth. Al-
though some procedure for judicial monitoring of the placement process
is clearly necessary, quaere whether the judge is the appropriate authority
to have program-placement responsibility.3 6
The conflict between the Cohen/Junker and Singer/Rutherford-Cohen
Standards should therefore probably be resolved in favor of the latter.
However, that cannot be accomplished simply by amending the Cohen/
Junker volumes because even some of Singer's Standards adopt the
Cohen/Junker position. For example, Dispositions part 2.2 directs the
judge to choose "a particular program" according to the "needs and
desires of the juvenile.137 And Dispositions part 1.2(G) prohibits the
imposition of any coercive disposition "unless the resources necessary to
carry out the disposition are shown to exist"; the commentary to this
Standard explains by way of example that the court may not sentence a
delinquent to attend a remedial program unless the "availability of such a
program" is first established. 38 Similarly, Dispositions part 3.3(E)(1) pro-
hibits imposition of a nonsecure custodial sentence unless the court finds
31 Because the language of several Standards in Reporter Singer's volume conflict with
this passage in her commentary, see notes 37-40 and accompanying text infra, one could also
argue that Singer's position on this issue is the same as Cohen's and Junker's. However, the
quoted commentary passage contains Singer's most explicit discussion of the matter and
seems to reveal her intention. In the remainder of this writing, therefore, I shall assume that
it does.
" This practice remains necessary under the Standards. See Dispositions pt. 2.2.
36 See In re Sylvia Clear, 58 Misc. 2d 699, 296 N.Y.S.2d 184 (Fam. Ct. 1969) (account of
one judge's valiant struggle to place a child).
31 See also Dispositions, Introduction at 2.
" Dispositions, Commentary, pt. 1.2(G), at 30.
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that "the needs of the juvenile ... can be met by placing the juvenile in a
particular nonsecure residence" (emphasis added). If the Standards ultimately
give the placement authority to the correctional agency, these three sec-
tions, which conflict with Singer's commentary to Dispositions part 2.239
should be amended accordingly .4 0
B. Disposition Criteria and Procedures
To make it easier to understand how the Standards would operate in
practice, let us assume the following hypothetical case. Sixteen-year-old
Walter has been found delinquent on a charge of assault and battery with
a deadly weapon. The charge arose from an incident in which Walter and
his friend George threw rocks at the sixty-year-old complainant, who was
standing on a ladder painting the second story of his house. The boys fled
when a passerby approached. The victim suffered several bruises and
lacerations on his face and back. At the adjudication hearing, Walter and
George admitted to the charge, explaining that they had been "just hors-
ing around."
This is Walter's fifth involvement with the juvenile court. When he was
twelve, he was twice brought to juvenile court on charges of unauthorized
use of an automobile; both charges were dismissed after a period of
"informal probation." The following year he was found delinquent on a
charge of breaking and entering and was placed on probation for one
year. Six months ago, he was again adjudicated delinquent for assault and
battery on his teacher. For that offense he was required to attend a
private, nonresidential school that provides special educational services
and psychological counseling. Codefendant George's court record and
disposition history are identical to Walter's.
How should the court proceed at the disposition stage of these boys'
hearings? Assault and battery with a deadly weapon is a class two offense,
for which the maximum disposition under the Standards is one year in
custody or two years conditional sanction. Assume that Judge X sentenced
Walter to one year in secure custody. The judge complied with the
Standards' requirements 41 of written findings and reasons by making the
following statement:
The facts are not disputed. The sixteen-year-old defendant, Wal-
ter, maliciously stoned the elderly victim under circumstances that
could easily have resulted in permanent disability or even death. The
victim did suffer painful injuries, for which he received hospital
treatment. Furthermore, Walter is no stranger to this court; he has
apparently not taken advantage of our former leniency. Testimony
3' See text accompanying notes 33 & 34 supra.
40 For example, Dispositions parts 2.2 and 3.3(E)(1) could be amended so as to be directed
to the agency, not the court. Part 1.2(G) could be changed to require a showing at the
disposition hearing that appropriate facilities exist, and a post-placement report to the court
and defense counsel, within a specified period of time, on the completed placement. The
Standard could also provide for a hearing on the report date, upon motion.
" Dispositions pt. 2.1; Procedures pt. 7.1(A).
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regarding the defendant's psychological and family background,
which defense counsel offered in evidence, is irrelevant. I sentence
Walter to serve one year in secure residential placement. In my view,
no lesser disposition would deter the defendant or his like-minded
peers from committing similar offenses in the future, nor would it
meet the Standards' requirement that he be punished as he deserves.
Assume further that Walter's co-defendant, George, whose age, prior
record and culpability in this delinquent act are all identical to Walter's,
was sentenced by Judge Y to one year in secure custody. However, Judge
Y suspended the sentence for two years on the condition that George
continue to attend the special day school in which he was enrolled and
that he take advantage of court-ordered psychiatric services for two
years. 42 Judge Y made the following statement for the record:
The facts are not disputed. This sixteen-year-old defendant,
George, maliciously stoned the elderly victim under circumstances
that could easily have resulted in permanent disability or even death.
The victim did suffer painful injuries, for which he received hospital
treatment. Furthermore, George is no stranger to this court; he has
apparently not taken advantage of our former leniency. I sentence
him, therefore, to one year in secure residential placement.
Although normally in such a case I would require the defendant to
serve the sentence of confinement, I have decided to suspend
George's penalty for two years, on the condition that he continue to
attend the Hill School regularly and that he participate daily until
5:30 p.m. in its after-school counseling and recreation program. He
must also participate in such individual and group therapy sessions as
shall be prescribed by Dr. Jones of the Valley Mental Health Clinic.
The Clinic is ordered to give George appropriate treatment services.
At home, George must obey the reasonable requirements of his
parents and of our probation office. Finally, he must refrain from
violating the law.
This order is based on the following facts that I have found at the
disposition hearing. My findings rest mainly upon the reports and
recommendations of Dr. Jones, and of Dr. Peters, clinical psycholo-
gist at the Hill School:
1. George is the oldest of five children. He lives with his mother.
When he was nine, his father, a housepainter, deserted the family.
2. George is of normal intelligence but has a severe perceptual
learning disability. He performs substantially below grade level in all
academic subjects. However, he has begun to make academic prog-
ress since he started attending the Hill School.
3. George has an emotional disturbance relating to his father's
42 See Dispositions pts. 3.2(A), (C), (D). Thus, Judge Y effectively decided that George's
disposition category should be a "conditional sanction."
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abandonment of the family. "His present offense, directed against an
adult male housepainter, was an expression of repressed feelings of
rage against his absent father." (Letter from Dr. Jones.)
4. George's academic and emotional needs can best be served by
continued attendance at the Hill School, if the School's resources are
supplemented by outpatient psychiatric treatment at the Valley
Clinic.
5. The state's attorney has failed to prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that placement in either a nonsecure or secure residen-
tial facility would satisfy the criteria established by the Standards.
By this disposition I hope to protect the public from further
acting-out behavior by George and at the same time meet this boy's
needs. If, of course, by his future behavior he shows this court that he
cannot cooperate effectively in his own rehabilitation, I shall be
forced to commit him to the custody of the Department for place-
ment in a secure residential facility.
Judges X and Y have both purported to act in accordance with the
Standards; their dispositions and disposition philosophies, however, differ
radically. They seem to disagree on two fundamental issues under the
Standards: What relevance to disposition has information about the de-
fendant's environmental and personal characteristics (hereinafter re-
ferred to for convenience as the "social history")? What goals should the
disposition serve?
Considering only the recent public statements about the Standards, one
might swiftly conclude that Judge X, whose decision fairly reeks of "just
deserts" and "proportionality," has been faithful to the Standards, while
Judge Y's sentence embodies the same rehabilitative approach that the
Standards reject. This conclusion may be correct. But, as we shall see, the
Standards hardly foreclose one from drawing the opposite conclusion.
1. The Relevance of Social History
Let us first consider the relevance of the delinquent's social history to
disposition under the Standards. Did Judge Y properly rely upon such
information in deciding to suspend the custodial sanction against George?
Did Judge X properly exclude evidence of Walter's social history as "ir-
relevant"? Unfortunately, the Standards do not give a wholly clear an-
swer. Professor Cohen's volume on Dispositional Procedures addresses
the issue most directly, but not decisively:
2.3 Information base.
A. The information essential to a disposition should consist of the
juvenile's age; the nature and circumstances of the offense or of-
fenses upon which the underlying adjudication is based, such evi-
dence not being limited to that which was or may be introduced at the
adjudication; and any prior record of adjudicated delinquency and
disposition thereof.
1977]
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B. Information concerning the social situation or the personal
characteristics of the juvenile, including the results of psychological
testing, psychiatric evaluations, and intelligence testing, may be consid-
ered as relevant to a disposition.
C. The social history may include information concerning the
family and home situation; school records ... any prior contacts with
social agencies; and othersimilar items . . . . (Emphases added.)
Beyond the statement that social history "may be considered as relevant,"
Professor Cohen's volume provides no criteria by which a court should
decide when a defendant's social history is relevant. Rather, Cohen recog-
nizes the intimate connection between this issue and the substantive goals
of dispositions and accordingly defers to the Dispositions volume-
apparently not yet drafted when he wrote.
The kind of information that is relevant and helpful in arriving at a
suitable disposition cannot be separated from the goal or goals sought
by the disposition .... As a general proposition .... the stronger the
commitment to a benevolent or therapeutic objective, the stronger
the claim to broader information about the juvenile and his or her
situation. On the other hand, the stronger the commitment to a
disposition fashioned on 'just desserts" [sic] principles, the less need
for information, beyond the nature and circumstances of the offense,
age, and the prior record of adjudicated delinquency.
It is not within the scope ot this volume to resolve the issues
relating to the proper objectives for dispositions. Thus, the standards
are drafted to accommodate both 'just desserts" and benevolence. 43
As modified by Cohen's commentary, therefore, Dispositions Procedure
part 2.3(B) really means: "[Social history] may be considered as relevant to
a disposition" to the extent permitted by the volume on Dispositions. Therefore,
to resolve any controversy that may exist between Judges X and Y, to that
volume we must turn.
The Dispositions Standards do not directly address the admissibility of a
defendant's social history; one must resort to inference from the Stan-
dards, and to Reporter Singer's commentary. These sources make the
Reporter's intent clear. Social history is not generally relevant to the
judge's choice of the disposition "category and duration"; that decision is
made, within the bounds of legislatively prescribed maximums, by refer-
ence solely to the class of offense committed, as well as the defendant's
age, prior record, and culpability, considered in light of mitigati ig or
aggravating circumstances surrounding his commission of the offense. 44
Once the- court has chosen the duration and category of sanction, the
13 Procedures, Commentary, pt. 2.3, at 31-32.
44 Dispositions pt. 2.1; id., Commentary at 2, 26, 35. The elastic phrase "circumstances of
the particular case" in Dispositions part 2.1 is apparently intended to exclude such facts as
George's repressed rage at adult male housepainters. See Dispositions, Commentary, pts. 2.1
& 2.2 passim; Procedures, Commentary, pts. 2.3(A) & (B), at 31-32. And, presumably, infor-
mation as to the delinquent's prior record could not include evidence regarding his success
or failure at particular court-imposed placements. See Procedures pt. 2.3; Dispositions,
Commentary, pt. 2.1, at 35.
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delinquent's social history becomes relevant and therefore admissible into
evidence45 for the purpose of choosing "a particular program within the
category" in accordance with the "needs and desires of the juvenile. '46
We may therefore infer that the disposition process under the Stan-
dards would consist of three stages. First, the judge chooses the disposi-
tion "category" and duration (for example, conditional sanction, two
years) without reference to social history; in the second stage, the judge
hears evidence of social history to select a disposition type within the
category (supervisory sanction, community supervision); 47 and in the
third, post-judicial stage, the correctional authorities4 choose a particular
program within the disposition category and type (attendance at the
YMCA after-school program), again with regard to social history.
Was Judge X correct, then, to sentence Walter to secure custody without
considering his social history? This depends, in part, upon the meaning of
"category": is "custody" the category, or is "secure custody"?4 9 If the
former, then Judge X erred by refusing to hear evidence of Walter's social
history before deciding the disposition "type" within the category of
"custody"; if the latter, then he did not.50 Unfortunately, the Standards
lack precise definitions, or consistent usage, of such terms as "disposition,"
"category," "type," "level" and "particular program.' 51
" See Procedures pt. 2.5(A).
4' Dispositions pt. 2.2; id., Commentary at 2, 38-39. Singer states in her commentary to
Standard 2.2:
Since the factors relevant to the selection of the appropriate duration and category of
disposition ... may give no guidance to the sentencing judge regarding the most
appropriate placement or particular pro ram within the chosen category, it is appro-
pnate to consider whatever social or psychological information has been itroducea by
the juvenile or by a presentence invesugation concerning such factors as the juvenile's
need for remedial education or training, his or her willingness to enroll in a special
program for alcoholics or drug addicts,his or her willingness to make restitution, etc.
Dispositions, Commentary, pt. 2.2, at 38-39.
47 Presumably, then, the court's statement of its findings, reasons and objectives under
Procedures parts 7.1(A)(1) and (2) would relate to "deserts" regarding the first stage
decision and to "needs" regarding the second.
41 We continue here the assumption discussed above, see notes 33 & 34 and accompanying
text supra, that the correctional agency, rather than the judge, has the responsibility under
the Singer Standards for choosing particular programs. Under such a view, Judge Y over-
stepped his authority by ordering George to attend the Hill School and receive therapy at
the Valley Clinic.
49 Another division within "custodial sanctions" is "continuous" or "intermittent" custody.
Dispositions pt. 3.3(D). Does the court determine the particular level of custody with or
without hearing social history?
50 Although in our hypothetical case Walter's lawyer offered to introduce evidence of
social history, what if he had not? Does Dispositions part 2.2 affirmatively require the court
and agency to gather and use social information in order to make any disposition or
placement decisions? In this context, Dispositions part 2.2 may conflict with Procedures part
2.3(B).
51 An important related problem is the lack of terminological correlation between the
Dispositions and Procedures volumes. The latter completely fails to distinguish among
various levels of disposition decisions; it simply directs the court to "determine the appro-
priate disposition ... after the disposition hearing." Procedures pt. 7.1(A). But the Disposi-
tions Standards envision several disposition decisions, made by different agencies and using
different information bases. The Dispositional Procedures standards would be clearer and
more useful if modified to take account of the procedural and evidentiary complexities
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An additional problem that arises when we attempt to evaluate the use
of social history by Judges X and Y concerns the Standards' substantive
criteria for imposing custodial sanctions. Whether we consider "custody"
or "secure/nonsecure custody" as the "category" that the judge must
choose without reference to social history, a close reading of Dispositions
part 3.3(E) 52 strongly-if not compellingly-suggests the impossibility of
deciding whether to impose any custodial sanction without considering
the delinquent's social history. This point has been discussed elsewhere in
this symposium. s 3 We must therefore conclude that Judges X and Y both
erred, the latter for deciding George's disposition category, "conditional
sanction," on the forbidden basis of social history, and the former for
sentencing Walter to secure custody without inquiring whether that sanc-
tion was "necessary" to prevent Walter from engaging in further antisocial
conduct-an inquiry that could not rationally occur without reference to
his social history. 54
Thus far in this section we have been discussing the first issue upon
which our two hypothetical judges disagree: the relevance of social history
to dispositions. Let us now turn to their second disagreement: what are
the proper goals of dispositions under the Standards?
2. The Goals of Disposition
As the preceding discussion has shown, the criteria in Dispositions part
3.3(E) governing the imposition of custodial sanctions force one to ques-
tion descriptions of the Standards as single-mindedly devoted to "just
implied by the Standards on Dispositions. Probably, the judicial disposition hearing must be
divided into stages according to the admissibility of social history.
52 3.3 Custodial.
E. Levels of custody ...
1. Nonsecure residences.
No court should sentence a juvenile to reside in a nonsecure residence unless ... the
court finds that any less severe disposition would be grossly inadequate to the needs of
the juvenile and tnat such needs can be met by placing the juvenile in a particular
nonsecure residence.
2. Secure facilities.
b. No court should sentence a juvenile to confinement in a secure facility unless ... the
court finds that such confinement is necessary to prevent the juvenile from causing
injury to the personal or substantial property interests of another.
Dispositions pt. 3.3(E). See also Dispositions, Commentary, pt. 3.3(E)(1), at 69-70.
" See Panel Discussion, supra note 4, at 771-72.
51 One cannot escape this dilemma by calling "custody" the "category" and concluding
that, having imposed that sanction, Judge X could (on remand, let us say) hear evidence of
social history to decide in which level of custody to place Walter. In many cases a delinquent
sentenced to "custody" on "just deserts" principles will not satisfy the contrasting criteria of
Dispositions part 3.3(E), which must be met before the court can sentence him to either
secure or nonsecure custody. Because all custodial facilities are of one type or the other, in
such cases the custodial sanction simply becomes unavailable. A saving interpretation of this
contradiction in the Standards is difficult to imagine.
This analysis suggests that, contrary to Procedures part 2.3(B), the court should be required
to consider evidence of the defendant's social history before choosing any disposition on the
basis of his "needs."
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deserts" or "proportional punishment. ' 55 But those descriptions have
been offered by critics, 56 not supporters, of the Standards. What do the
Standards themselves establish as dispositional goals?
By way of general background, let us recall an important distinction
that has been made by Professor H.L.A. Hart. It is the distinction between
"general justifying aims" of punishment, and "limiting principles of
distribution"-or of "allocation"-of punishment. "Just deserts, ' 5 7 for
example, might be chosen as the justifying aim of punishment;58 that is, we
might choose to sentence an offender in order to make him suffer for his
wrongdoing. Or, we might reject 'just deserts" as a goal and adopt crime
reduction as the justifying aim of punishment, that is, we might fix an
offender's sentence according to its expected effect on the incidence of
crime. Concurrently, we might employ 'just deserts" as a limitation on
the "distribution" of punishment to particular offenders by providing that
no sentence shall be disproportionately severe in relation to the offender's
culpability. In that case, for example, a sentence that might be justified on
preventive grounds59-such as ten years' imprisonment for jaywalking-
would be limited by application of the 'just deserts" principle ahd there-
fore reduced to a penalty that was more proportionate to the defendant's
culpability.60
Returning to our hypothetical case under the Standards, Judge X has
justified Walter's sentence on two grounds: crime prevention (deterrence)
and 'just deserts." Judge Y has also aimed for prevention ("protect the
public") and for rehabilitation-the nonpunitive goal of traditional
I understand "just deserts" and "proportionality" to be related to the concepts of
"retribution" and "culpability." "Retribution" has varying meanings, but we may define it
here as the infliction of pain or suffering on an offender who is culpable. See N. Walker,
Sentencing in a Rational Society 5-19 (1971); Hart, Prolegomenon to the Principles of
Punishment, in H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility 9 (1968). "Culpability" ("guilt,"
"blameworthiness") in turn is measured by reference to two sorts of factors: the severity of
the harm caused ("seriousness of the offense") and the offender's moral/psychological
relationship to his harmful act (mens rea, age, mental health, etc.). "Just deserts" ("propor-
tional punishment") is punishment whose severity is proportional to the offender's culpabil-
ity. "Just deserts," then, is a refinement of "retribution" that adds the element of propor-
tionality.
56 Judge Margaret C. Driscoll has been quoted as saying in reference to the Standards:
"All of a sudden it has been decided that the 'just deserts' rationale is the only answer to
juvenile crime." 5 Juv. Just. Dig. 5 (Apr. 8, 1977). See also dissenting remarks of Commis-
sioners Patricia M. Wald ("I hope we are not so cynical as to build a juvenile justice system on
the tarnished 'just deserts' model of the adult penal system," Dispositions at 135) and Judge
Justine Wise Polier ("[t]he right of a child to treatment ... is subordinated to the concept of
'proportional punishment,'" id. at 133).
" See note 55 supra.
58 Of course, a correctional system might-and usually does-explicitly adopt multiple,
and even conflicting, justifying aims. This requires the sentencing judge, acting with more or
less guidance from the legislature or judicial administration, to decide upon a sentence that
reflects a proper accommodation among those aims.
19 Preventive devices include, inter alia, deterrence, reform and restraint. The preventive
approach is often called the "utilitarian" approach. See generally N. Walker, supra note 55, ch.
3, at 3-4.
10 Professor Walker refers to an advocate of this use of the retribution principle as a
"limiting retributivist." Id. at 14-15.
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juvenile court disposition. Which, if either, judge has correctly observed
the goals of disposition under the Standards?
Although the Standards and commentaries occasionally refer to the
goal of 'just deserts" or "proportionality," they do not unambiguously
embrace it. In her strongest statement along these lines, Reporter Singer
writes:
these standards unequivocally take the position that justice and fairness
demand that the system respond only to past illegal behavior, rather
than to predictions of future conduct.
6 1
However, she confusingly adds that the Standards reflect "an accommo-
dation between the views of those who would advocate either a strict
proportionality or a strict treatment approach. '62 Reporter Cohen readily
acknowledges the same compromise in his volume.6 3
Disposition Standards 1.1 and 2.1, quoted above,6 4 respectively establish
the major goals of disposition: part 1.1 adopts crime prevention as the
general justifying aim of juvenile corrections; part 2.1 seemingly adopts
"just deserts" as the primary guide to the distribution of punishment in
individual cases. 65 How do these two Standards operate together and in
relation to other elements of disposition under the Standards?
If the general aim of juvenile corrections is to "reduce juvenile crime by
maintaining the integrity of the substantive law proscribing certain behav-
ior and by developing individual responsibility for lawful behavior,' 66 then
surely one must applaud the deterrent rationale of Walter's sentence:
individual and general deterrence are both recognized devices for pre-
venting crime and for promoting individual responsibility. 67 Within the
scope of part 1.1, Judge X might also have considered the restraining and
rehabilitative functions of his sentence, which also serve preventive
goals. Or so it would seem from that part's language. But the Reporter's
61 Dispositions, Introduction at 2 (emphasis added).
62 Id.
.3 After describing the contrasting procedural implications of dispositional goals centered
on treatment and "just deserts," Cohen writes:
Between these two extremes lies the view that, while an adjudication of delinquency is
closely analogous to a finding of criminal responsibility, dispositional procedures should
be sufficiently flexible to reflect the relative seriousness of the underlying conduct. An
adversary type format, as will appear, can be made consistent with obtaining help as well
as obtaining a just disposition.
Procedures, Introduction at 6. Cohen also includes the following among the objectives of his
Standards: "[Wlithin the legislative limits fixed for the underlying offense, provide an
opportunity to fashion a disposition responsive to the individual condition or situation of the
juvenile." Id. at 14.
'4 See text following note 12 supra.
65 Significantly, the traditional juvenile court goal of "rehabilitation" is omitted from both
Standards. As we have seen, the Standards attempt to relegate considerations of the
juvenile's "individual needs" to a secondary stage of the disposition process. See discussion at
part III A supra. This represents a major shift in dispositional philosophy.
66 Dispositions pt. 1.1.
67 See N. Walker, supra note 55, chs. 4, 5; Hart, Punishment and the Elimination of
Responsibility, in H.L.A. Hart, supra note 55, at 158, 181-82.
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commentary6 belies this understanding: neither deterrence 9 nor re-
habilitation,70 we are told, can be accepted as "fundamental purposes"7 1
of the juvenile correctional system. Prevention through the incarceration
of offenders is not discussed. And retribution, also, is implicitly dismissed
as a justifying aim. 72
How, then, can Walter's sentence serve the preventive purposes of part
1.1? The commentary states:
[T]he standard is intended to serve as a limiting principle designed to
narrow the aims of the correctional system to a more modest
perspective ...
In searching for the limiting principle ... the standard returns to
some of the basic elements of Anglo-American law. One important
function . . .is to ensure that the code's substantive provisions are observed
by making the strictures of the code credible. Thus ... certain actions
are forbidden by law and designated as offenses "to announce to
society that these actions are not to be done and to secure that fewer of
them are done."
73
The commentary goes on to explain that the Standard attempts to pro-
mote the development of individual responsibility "by providing oppor-
tunities for personal and social growth.
7 4
This commentary invites several critical questions. First, how will the
correctional system "ensure" the observance of substantive laws if not by
resort to preventive techniques such as deterrence, restraint and rehabili-
tation, all of which the drafters reject? Or have the utilitarian goals
professed in part 1.1 no functional significance? Second, does not the
proper route to developing "individual responsibility" for lawful behavior
lie in the forthright application of punishment for delinquency, rather
than in the delivery of services to facilitate "growth"?75
Finally, we must examine the role and operation of the "just deserts"
principle.
A fundamental confusion arises from an apparent contradiction in the
Dispositions volume. In the commentary to part 1.1, Reporter Singer
implicitly rejects retribution as a "primary" aim of juvenile corrections. 76
68 Dispositions, Commentary, pt. 1.1, at 15-20; see note 85 infra.
61 Dispositions, Commentary, pt. 1.1, at 180.
70 Id.
71 Although the commentary speaks only of "fundamental purposes," the context makes
plain the rejection of these aims as primary sentencing rationales.
72 Dispositions, Commentary, pt. 1.1, at 16.
73 Dispositions, Commentary, pt. 1.1, at 18, quoting H.L.A. Hart, Prolegomenon to the
Principles of Punishment, in Theories of Punishment 358 (S.E. Grupp ed. 1971) (emphasis
added).
74 Id. at 19.
71 Surely a major argument against the operation of the "rehabilitative ideal" in juvenile
court is that society's reluctance to punish misconduct hampers the development of adoles-
cent self-control. See D. Matza, Delinquency and Drift 90-96 (1964); Hart, The Aims of the
Criminal Law, 23 Law & Contemp. Prob. 401, 410 (1958); Katz, Law, Psychiatry and Free
Will, 22 U. Chi. L. Rev. 397, 399 (1955).
76 Dispositions, Commentary, pt. 1.1, at 16.
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This would be understandable if the Standards employed 'just deserts"
simply as a limitation on the distribution of punishment to individual
offenders; 77 parts 1.2(E) and (F), restricting sentencing discretion within
the bounds of graded statutory maximums, do precisely that. But part 2.1
apparently makes "just deserts" the substantive guide to setting the dis-
position category and duration, rather than an upper limit on a sentence
determined with reference to other disposition goals. Part 2.1 directs the
judge to impose the "least restrictive [penalty] that is appropriate to the
seriousness of the offense, as modified by [the defendant's] degree of
culpability." Culpability is calculated by considering three factors: the
defendant's age, his prior record and the particular circumstances of his
offense.
Two sets of questions arise regarding part 2.1. First, how do these
dispositional criteria relate to the general purposes of corrections set forth
in part 1.1? (If retribution is not the purpose of proportional sanctions,
what is? 8) How do these dispositional factors relate to the special criteria
for the imposition of custodial custody?7 9 To the standard requiring the
reduction or termination of dispositions if required services are not being
provided?80
Second, how does the judge select the "least restrictive" penalty that is
"appropriate"? In Walter's case, for example-putting to one side Judge
X's arguably erroneous failure to consider the defendant's social history
under Dispositions part 3.3(E)-was the choice of a custodial sanction
proper? Recall that the Standards establish a presumption against the use
of custodial sanctions8 ' and require evidentiary support of any chosen
category of sanction by a "preponderance. 81 2 This means that "the bur-
den of persuading the court that less severe sentencing alternatives would
be inappropriate . . . rests with the state."8" Presumably, the prosecution
must establish this negative proposition before the court hears any evi-
dence of the defendant's social history. Given the admissible facts-age,
prior record and commission of the offense under the circumstances
77 See text accompanying notes 57-60 supra. Singer's commentary at 18 actually describes
part 1.1 as embodying the Standards' "limiting principle" for sentencing; "just deserts" is
never so described. Compared with the open-ended rehabilitative approach of traditional
juvenile court dispositions, preventive principles do represent a more limiting, modest
correctional goal. But, as between crime prevention and "just deserts," the Standards are
unclear about which, if either, principle describes a substantive aim of sentencing, and which
describes a limit upon pursuit of that aim.
Compare Sanctions part 1.1(B): "The purposes of a juvenile delinquency code should be:
... to safeguard conduct that is without fault or culpability from condemnation as delin-
quent .... " This language implies the use of retribution as a limiting principle, not a
justifying aim, of punishment.
78 See text accompanying note 72 supra. Retribution as a justifying aim of punishment is
discussed by N. Walker, supra note 55, at 5-6.
79 Dispositions pts. 3.3(E)(1) & (2).
80 Dispositions pt. 4.1(D)(1); see Panel Discussion, supra note 4, at 771-72.
" Dispositions pt. 3.3(B).
12 Procedures pt. 2.5(B).
83 Dispositions, Commentary, pt. 2.1, at 38.
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shown-is the "inappropriateness" of, let us say, a conditional sanction for
Walter a matter susceptible of factual "proof," or a matter of values?
Reporter Singer distinguishes the "least restrictive alternative" test in
Dispositions part 2.1 from its parent doctrine in criminal corrections,
pointing out that the latter test typically refers to public safety or other
penal purposes, but part 2.1 does not. 4 The commentary explains the
change as follows:
[R]equiring that the court impose the least drastic sentencing alterna-
tive that is "consistent with the goals of the penal system" . . . gives
little guidance, especially in light of our limited knowledge regarding
which punishments deter and which offenders present a threat to the
public safety.8 5
This passage implies that the "seriousness of the offense" criterion of part
2.1 provides more objective guidance and certainty than "protection of
the public." That is a most doubtful proposition.
8 6
C. Criteria for Modifying the Disposition
Part 7.1(B) of the Standards on Dispositional Procedures concerns
post-sentencing modification of the disposition:
B. The court may correct an illegal disposition at any time and may
correct a disposition imposed in an illegal manner within [120 days]
of the disposition.
The volume footnotes a dissenting view:
Commission member Justine Wise Polier regards this provision for
correcting dispositions as too narrow. She does not believe it should
be limited to illegal dispositions, but should embrace the requirement
to review dispositions when the child, the parents, or the agency
having custody of the child requests review by reason of a change of
circumstance or evidence that the child is ready for a less restrictive
placement.8 7
This disagreement between Judge Polier and supporters of the Standard
as written plainly relates to the conflict between advocates of "treatment"
84 Dispositions part 3.3(E)(2)(b) uses a more traditional, preventive test. And if one
interprets "needs of the juvenile" as a euphemism for "needs of the pubfic"-a common
tendency in juvenile courts-so does part 3.3(E)(2)(a). From the standpoint of policy, would
not the euphemistic version make better sense than the literal one?
'5 Dispositions, Commentary, pt. 2.1, at 38. This same "lack of knowledge" is the drafters'
reason for rejecting rehabilitation and deterrence as sentencing goals under Dispositions
part 1.1. Id., Commentary, pt. 1.1, at 15-19. For an opposing view of the policy implications
arising from insufficient empirical evidence on the utility of punishments, see N. Walker,
supra note 55, at 61-62.
86 [P]erhaps the hardest question which the retributivist has to answer is "How should
we decide the form or degree of suffering which is appropriate to the offense?" ...
[R]etributivists find it difficult to suggest any objective measure of appropriateness. Some
seem to appeal to a kind of intuition .... Others seem to appeal to a consensus of
opinion.
N. Walker, supra note 55, at 9-10.
87 Procedures pt. 7.1(B), n.*.
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and 'just deserts." Part 7.1(B) is consistent with the 'just deserts" philos-
ophy expressed in Dispositions part 2.1, with the abolition of discretionary
parole mandated by Dispositions part 5.3, and with the general principle
that sentenced juveniles may refuse to participate in correctional treat-
ment programs stated in Dispositions part 4.2. But Dispositions part 5.1,
which impliedly supersedes the criteria of Dispositional Procedures part
7.1(b), takes us in a different direction:
Dispositional orders may be modified as follows:
5.1 Reduction because disposition inequitable.
A juvenile, his or her parents, the correctional agency with respon-
sibility for the juvenile, or the sentencing court on its own motion
may petition the ... court ... at any time during the course of
disposition to reduce the nature or the duration of the disposition on
the basis that it exceeds the statutory maximum; was imposed in an
illegal manner; is unduly severe with reference to the seriousness of
the offense, the culpability of the juvenile, or the dispositions given
by the same or other courts to juveniles convicted of similar offenses;
or if it a pears at the time of the application that by so doing it can prevent an
unduly harsh or inequitable result. (Emphasis added.)
This Standard, of course, substantially expands the grounds of mod-
ification allowed by Dispositional Procedures part 7.1(B) in the direction
advocated by Judge Polier. Depending upon how one interprets the
flexible language of the final clause, Dispositions part 5.1 may also com-
promise the principle of 'just deserts."
Assume, for example, that Walter and George have both been sen-
tenced to one year's custody in the same secure facility. After four months
the correctional agency petitions the court requesting permission to re-
lease George to the custody of his parents so that he may return to the
Hill School and receive outpatient therapy at the Valley Clinic. The
agency supports the petition with affidavits88 from several correctional
workers attesting to George's improved attitude, his increased self-control,
and an improvement in his mother's ability to cope with his needs, and so
forth. Furthermore, the affiants expressly relate George's improvement to
the fact that he and his mother have voluntarily8 9 participated in several
of the facility's treatment programs during George's stay at the facility.
(They contrast George's desire for self-improvement with his friend Wal-
s See Corrections pt. 5.1(B).
89 An important side issue arises from the Standards' prohibition (Dispositions pt. 3.3(C))
on court-ordered remedial programs for delinquents sentenced to custodial sanctions: is the
prohibition waivable? One would expect many defendants to choose submission to court-
ordered (nonsecure) custodial treatment services as the price of avoiding secure confinement
or transfer to criminal court. The Standards do not discuss this possibility. (The Standards
apparently do not prohibit the court from ordering the correctional agency to make special
services available to a confined juvenile-but a judge considering whether to order either
secure custody or transfer to criminal court would probably not be dissuaded from either
action by the juvenile's bare, unenforceable promise to participate in services to which the
court's order would ensure access.)
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ter's "negativism and passivity.") May the court grant the agency's peti-
tion?
Although an affirmative decision would arguably rest upon an over-
generous interpretation of the phrase "unduly harsh or inequitable,"
consider the Reporter's commentary to part 5.1:
The considerations relevant to the court's determination of
whether to reduce a disposition are the same that were relevant to the
initial sentencing decision (see Standard 2.1), with the addition of any
information ... concerning the behavior and circumstances of the
juvenile subsequent to imposition of the disposition In the latter case,
reduction would be indicated when, for example, the circumstances (in
addition to the seriousness of the offense and the juvenile's age and prior
record) that warranted imposition of a custodial disposition pursuant to Stan-
dard 3.3 E. no longer exist or when the juvenile's behavior indicates that a
disposition as drastic as commitment to a secure facility no longer is required.90
It is most difficult to reconcile the italicized language with the volume's
virtual abolition of parole, 91 or the view that the "needs" criteria of
Dispositions part 3.3(E)(1) and (2)-governing the imposition of custodial
sanctions-are anomalous departures from the Reporter's intention to
implement the "just deserts" principle. The language also undermines
the juvenile's right to refuse services. As Reporter Singer states:
Inherent in the right to refuse services is the requirement that
juveniles not receive different treatment according to whether or not
they choose to participate in correctional programs. Juveniles who
voluntarily choose to participate should be treated no more leniently
than those who do not, and juveniles who exercise their right to
refuse should not be penalized in any way for so doing. 92
Indeed, the Reporter's commentary stresses that sentence modification
petitions under part 5.1 "should not be denied because of the juvenile's
,attitude' or because of the exercise of his or her right to refuse services or
participation in programs pursuant to Standard 4.2."93 But this disclaimer
would hardly comfort Walter, who would learn that George's early release
("parole"?) was justified not because he had participated in treatment
services, but because, having participated, his conduct showed that his
confinement was "no longer required" under Dispositions parts
3.3(E)(2)(b) and 5.1. In such a system, Walter and his family might be well
advised "voluntarily" to accept any proffered treatment services. 94
90 Dispositions, Commentary, pt. 5.1, at 127 (emphasis added).
91 If "improved behavior" qualifies a defendant for court-ordered release, one could
easily foresee routine agency petitions for modification, encouraged by bureaucratic
pressures of "bed space" and the like. The affidavits submitted in George's case would not,
of course, attest to purely objective "facts." See Panel Discussion, supra note 4, at 765-
66 (remarks of Professor Cohen).
92 Dispositions, Commentary, pt. 4.2, at 102.
93 Id., Commentary, pt. 5.1, at 127.
91 See Corrections pt. 4.10(E) (consent to receive services).
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IV. CONCLUSIONS
The overriding goal of disposition in juvenile courts traditionally has
been "rehabilitation," not punishment. At times we have justified the
rehabilitative goal in terms of crime prevention, or have hypocritically
used rehabilitative rhetoric to mask hidden preventive goals. The goal of
crime prevention, we might therefore say, has occupied an important,
vaguely recognized place in traditional juvenile court sentencing. In sharp
contrast, the distribution of "just deserts" until now has had no legitimate
place.
The Juvenile Justice Standards Project proposed Standards on disposi-
tion purportedly effect a radical shift in juvenile court philosophy from
"rehabilitation" to "just deserts." Our analysis has shown that the Stan-
dards indeed attempt to reject rehabilitation as a primary dispositional
goal. But, even focusing on design rather than implementation, they only
partially adopt the principle of "just deserts"; to a considerable extent,
they also reflect the aims of prevention and rehabilitation.
The Standards reflect the "just deserts" principle in the following key
respects: graded maximum penalties; the requirement that within those
maximums the court select the penalty most "appropriate" to the delin-
quent's culpability and degree of moral responsibility; restrictions on the
court's power to base the sentence on offender-related information; and
the abolition of parole. But other Standards qualify and, in some respects,
contradict the "just deserts" principle. No matter how serious the offense
or culpable the offender, the judge's sentencing discretion is uncon-
strained by minimum sentences. And the Standards restrict custodial
dispositions-which normally would be applied to the most serious
offenders-by tests that refer to values of crime prevention and rehabili-
tation (not "just deserts") and by a presumption against removing delin-
quents from their homes. Finally, an ambiguous Standard apparently
empowers the courts to reduce any disposition on grounds unrelated to
the "just deserts" principle. In view of these points, to speak of the
Standards as if they require judges to sentence delinquents according to
penalties that "fit the crime" is highly misleading.
Not only is the purported adoption of "just deserts" sentencing belied
by the incorporation of such opposing principles as prevention and re-
habilitation, but, in addition, the Standards fail to articulate a coherent
interrelationship among these various sentencing aims and criteria. This is
highly confusing.
In sum, one cannot fairly say that "just deserts" is "the" disposition
philosophy expressed in the Standards. Although it receives a novel
prominence among the Standards' disposition aims, it is only one among
several such aims. This is not to suggest that sentencing can or should
proceed according to any single value. But "[t]he problem ... is one of
the priority and relationship of purposes as well as their legitimacy .... ,,95
95 Hart, supra note 75, at 401.
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More work is needed to clarify what are the legitimate aims of disposition
under the Standards and why particular dispositional criteria are appro-
priate at various points of the decision-making process.
Significant problems also exist regarding coordination of the volumes
on Dispositional Procedures and on Dispositions. Because the former
volume was drafted earlier than the latter, 98 it lacks the sophisticated
procedural and evidentiary framework implicitly required by the substan-
tive Standards contained in the latter. Also, key issues such as the precise
scope of the judge's dispositional authority, and the relevance and timing
of evidence regarding the defendant's social history, require clarification.
These issues closely depend upon prior clarification of the substantive
goals sought to be achieved at various stages of the disposition process.
The formidable administrative difficulties of coordinating a project as
vast and ambitious as the Juvenile Justice Standards Project doubtless
account for most of the confusions and inconsistencies discussed in this
article. It would be unfortunate if the drafters' bold and innovative at-
tempts to inspire badly needed reforms in juvenile court sentencing were
permitted to flounder because of them. Hopefully, the necessary time and
resources will be found to review all of the draft volumes for the purpose
of clarifying ideas and eliminating inconsistencies and, wherever neces-
sary, to decide conflicting policy issues so that the finished volumes will
express a more unified, coherent system for dispositions.
"" See note 28 supra.
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